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I. INTRODUCTION
Mandamus relief is appropriate when a petitioner demonstrates a clear
abuse of discretion and has no adequate remedy by appeal.1 However,
mandamus is an “extraordinary” remedy and not a matter of right.2 Al-
though the Texas Supreme Court’s mandamus opinions during the past
year drew on previously recognized applications, mandamus relief in the
supreme court remains very much dependent on the particular circum-
stances of each case.
This Article analyzes, summarizes, and categorizes the fourteen su-
preme court mandamus opinions3 delivered during the Survey period of
December 1, 2019, through November 30, 2020. A particular focus of the
Article will be upon the mandamus element of lack of an adequate appel-
late remedy. The Texas Supreme Court’s opinions occasionally omit dis-
cussion of that element. Therefore, analysis of the inclusion or omission
of discussion of that element will provide guidance to practitioners.
II. MANDAMUS FUNDAMENTALS
The Texas Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over writs of mandamus stems
1. In re Mobile Mini, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 781, 783–84 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam).
2. “Mandamus . . . is an extraordinary remedy, not issued as a matter of right, but at
the discretion of the court. Although mandamus is not an equitable remedy, its issuance is
largely controlled by equitable principles.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d
124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d
366, 367 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding)).
3. See generally Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. 2019) (orig.
proceeding); In re Murrin Bros. 1885, Ltd., 603 S.W.3d 53 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding); In
re Turner, 591 S.W.3d 121 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding); In re Mobile Mini, Inc., 596
S.W.3d at 783; In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 808 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding); In re Ab-
bott, 601 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Lester, 602 S.W.3d
469 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding); In re Green Party of Tex., No. 20-0708, 2020 WL
5580156 (Tex. Sept. 18, 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Panchakarla, 602
S.W.3d 536 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Fox River Real Est. Holdings,
Inc., 596 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding); In re Hotze (Hotze I), No. 20-0430,
2020 WL 4046034 (Tex. July 17, 2020) (orig. proceeding); In re Hotze (Hotze II), No. 20-
0739, 2020 WL 5919726 (Tex. Oct. 7, 2020) (orig. proceeding); In re Tex. House Republican
Caucus PAC, No. 20-0663, 2020 WL 5351318 (Tex. Sept. 5, 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam); In re Republican Party of Tex., 605 S.W.3d 47 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam).
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from the Texas constitution.4 Specifically, § 3 of article V states, in part,
(1) “under such regulations as may be prescribed by law,” the supreme
court and its justices “may issue the writs of mandamus . . . and such
other writs, as may be necessary to enforce its jurisdiction,” and (2) the
Texas “Legislature may confer original jurisdiction on the [Texas] Su-
preme Court to issue writs of . . . mandamus in such cases as may be
specified, except as against the Governor of the State.”5
Consistent with those constitutional grants of authority, § 22.002(a) of
the Texas Government Code provides that the supreme court or a justice
of that court
may issue . . . all writs of . . . mandamus agreeable to the principles of
law regulating those writs, against a statutory county court judge, a
statutory probate court judge, a district judge, a court of appeals or a
justice of a court of appeals, or any officer of state government ex-
cept the governor, the court of criminal appeals, or a judge of the
court of criminal appeals.6
Further, the Texas Government Code § 22.002 states that “[t]he supreme
court or, in vacation, a justice of the supreme court may issue a writ of
mandamus to compel a statutory county court judge, a statutory probate
court judge, or a district judge to proceed to trial and judgment in a case,”
and
[o]nly the supreme court has the authority to issue a writ of manda-
mus . . . against any of the officers of the executive departments of
the government of this state to order or compel the performance of a
judicial, ministerial, or discretionary act or duty that, by state law,
the officer or officers are authorized to perform.7
Additionally, a number of Texas statutes and rules provide for mandamus
proceedings in certain courts as to specifically identified matters.8
4. See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 3, 6.
5. Id. § 3(a). Also, § 6 of article V provides, in part, that the intermediate appellate
courts of Texas “shall have appellate jurisdiction co-extensive with the limits of their re-
spective districts” and “such other jurisdiction, original and appellate, as may be prescribed
by law.” Id. § 6(a).
6. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a).
7. Id. § 22.002(b)–(c). The mandamus jurisdiction of the Texas courts of appeals is
less broad than that of the Texas Supreme Court. Specifically, pursuant to Texas Govern-
ment Code § 22.221: (1) each of the fourteen courts of appeals or a justice thereof “may
issue a writ of mandamus and all other writs necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of the
court,” and (2) “each court of appeals . . . may issue . . . writs of mandamus . . . against a
judge of a district, statutory county, statutory probate county, or county court in the court
of appeals district” and certain magistrates and associate judges. Id. § 22.221 (a)–(b).
8. See, e.g., In re Lester, 602 S.W.3d at 472 (citing the Tim Cole Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. §§ 103.001–.154). The remedy of mandamus at the Texas Supreme
Court is provided to compel performance of the ministerial duty of the Comptroller of
Public Accounts. See In re Smith, 333 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding). In re
Occidental Chem. Corp., 561 S.W.3d 146, 153–54 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (conclud-
ing that the statute gives the Texas Supreme Court original jurisdiction to hear and deter-
mine certain suits involving imposition of ad valorem taxes by multiple taxing units on
same property confers original mandamus jurisdiction in supreme court); City of Hous. v.
Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 549 S.W.3d 566, 582–84 (Tex. 2018) (affirming denial of
city’s plea to jurisdiction where suit for mandamus was proper proceeding to compel dis-
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Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52 provides procedural require-
ments for mandamus proceedings in both the supreme court and the
courts of appeals.9 “If the supreme court and [a] court of appeals have
concurrent [mandamus] jurisdiction, the petition must be presented first
to the court of appeals unless there is a compelling reason not to do so,”
which must be stated in the petition.10 Further, failure to comply with the
additional requirements of Rule 52 may result in denial of relief.11
III. MANDAMUS STATISTICS
Statistics for the Texas Supreme Court’s six most recent fiscal years
show that dispositions, year to year, have been close to or in excess of the
petitions filed.12 Further, the rate at which the petitions have been
granted in that period, in the range from 3.3% to 7.5%, demonstrates that
mandamus is indeed an “extraordinary” remedy.13
closure of information pursuant to Texas Public Information Act and other nondiscretion-
ary governmental action required by law); In re Nestle USA, Inc., 387 S.W.3d 610, 617
(Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding) (concluding that the statutory language allowed for Texas
Supreme Court mandamus review of constitutionality of franchise tax statute); TEX. R.
APP. P. 24.4(a) (providing that a party may seek Texas Supreme Court mandamus review
of a court of appeals’ ruling on a motion challenging trial court’s determination of amount
of security required to supersede judgment); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 273.061 (“The
[Texas] Supreme Court or a court of appeals may issue writ of mandamus to compel the
performance of any duty imposed by law in connection with the holding of an election or a
political party convention, regardless of whether the person responsible for performing
duty is a public officer.”).
9. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52. The party seeking relief in a mandamus proceeding is the
relator and the person against whom relief is sought is the respondent. Id. at 52.2. “A
person whose interest would be directly affected by the relief sought is a real party in
interest and a party to the case.” Id.
10. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(e); see also In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2020)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam); State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 793–94 (Tex. 2015) (orig.
proceeding) (“[A] party may not circumvent the court of appeals simply by arguing futil-
ity.”); Chambers-Liberty Counties Navigation Dist. v. State, 575 S.W.3d 339, 356 (Tex.
2019) (orig. proceeding) (“Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(e) provides that if a
mandamus ‘petition is filed in the Supreme Court without first being presented to the court
of appeals, the petition must state the compelling reason why the petition was not first
presented to the court of appeals.’”); cf. In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d at 807 n.1 (noting that
without citing Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(e), the Texas Supreme Court said,
“[b]ecause this is a matter of state-wide importance requiring immediate attention, the
relators’ decision to bypass the court of appeals is warranted. See Perry v. Del Rio, 66
S.W.3d 239, 257 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding).”).
11. See, e.g., In re Charboneau, No. 05-18-00551-CV, 2018 WL 2276226, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Dallas May 18, 2018, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (mem. op.); In re Phillips,
No. 05-18-00543-CV, 2018 WL 2213888, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 15, 2018, orig. pro-
ceeding [mand. denied]) (mem. op.); In re Wade, No. 05-17-00046-CV, 2017 WL 462364, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 2, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
12. See TEX. JUDICIAL BRANCH, TEXAS SUPREME COURT ANNUAL STATISTICAL RE-
PORT SUPPLEMENT, https://www.txcourts.gov/statistics/annual-statistical-reports [https://
perma.cc/R2ER-UH4S].
13. See id.; In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding).
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Texas Supreme Court Mandamus Statistics: Past Five Fiscal Years
FISCAL YEAR 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 
New petitions 225 209 209 187 188 220 
Total dispositions 219 214 217 181 194 225 
Petitions denied 74.9%
(164) 
80.8% 76.5% 79% 79.9% 72% 
Petitions granted 5.5%
(12) 
3.3% 6.9% 6.6% 6.7% 7.5% 
IV. SUBJECT MATTER CATEGORIES OF RECENT TEXAS
SUPREME COURT MANDAMUS CASES
A. THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT CLAIMS AND WAIVER OF
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
The case of Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson14 clarifies, among other
things, the apparent conflict between a city’s governmental immunity and
claims brought “by mandamus or injunction to stop, prevent, or reverse a
violation or threatened violation” of the Open Meetings Act.15 Town of
Shady Shores involved a suit by the former city secretary of Shady
Shores, for, among other things, wrongful termination of her employ-
ment, reinstatement, and back wages. She also sought a declaratory judg-
ment pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA)16 that
she was terminated after a city council meeting that was conducted in
violation of the Open Meetings Act. The town asserted in its plea to the
jurisdiction and in its motions for summary judgment, among other
things, that it retains immunity from suit because the Open Meetings Act
does not waive governmental immunity with respect to declaratory judg-
ment claims under the UDJA.17 However, before directing remand to the
Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals for review of certain pleading is-
sues, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the Open Meetings Act
“waives the Town’s immunity from a suit ‘by mandamus or injunction to
stop, prevent, or reverse a violation or threatened violation’ of the
Act.”18
14. 590 S.W.3d 544, 556 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).
15. Id. at 556 (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.142(a)).
16. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001–37.011.
17. Town of Shady Shores, 590 S.W.3d at 555–56.
18. Id. at 556; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE § 551.142(a) (“An interested person, includ-
ing a member of the news media, may bring an action by mandamus or injunction to stop,
prevent, or reverse a violation or threatened violation of this chapter by members of a
governmental body.”).
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B. REVIEW OF DENIAL OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY AND DENIAL OF
TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12 MOTION
The Texas Supreme Court decided In re Murrin Brothers 1885, Ltd.,19 a
case over control of Fort Worth’s Billy Bob’s Texas (BBT)—often re-
ferred to as the world’s largest honky-tonk and rodeo. In that case, the
supreme court denied a petition for writ of mandamus filed by the Murrin
Group that sought reversal of the Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals’
refusal to disqualify the law firm of Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP from
representing some of the owners and, nominally, the LLC.20
The genuine legal news is the supreme court’s clarification of Texas law
regarding alleged conflicts of interest of law firms in derivative lawsuits.
The specific issue the supreme court addressed was whether a law firm is
automatically disqualified in a derivative suit when representing both the
LLC as a nominal defendant and some of the LLC’s owners.21
The supreme court addressed three points. First, the supreme court ob-
served that companies in derivative actions “are simultaneously ‘plain-
tiffs’ and ‘defendants,’ depending on how you look at it.”22 Second, in the
logical course of its analysis, the supreme court stated the obvious di-
lemma: if the company is deemed both plaintiff and defendant, “no law-
yer could ever represent it in derivative litigation because to do so would
automatically place the lawyer on both sides of the case. Obviously, that
is not the rule.”23 Second, having dispensed with the controversy of the
label that could be placed on the LLC as a party, the supreme court fo-
cused on the baseline practical problem of conflicts. The supreme court
instructed, “[T]he proper inquiry is to look to whether the substance of
the challenged representation requires the lawyer to take conflicting posi-
tions or to take a position that risks harming one of his clients.”24
Third, and preliminary to stating its conclusion, the supreme court re-
flected upon the different stances taken by courts across the country
about the alleged risks of harm to adverse parties in derivative actions.25
Some jurisdictions claim that representation of both the entity and some
of its owners is “categorically impermissible.”26 Others, including the
U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, reason, “[T]he interests
of the company and its controlling officers or directors are often aligned,
and separate counsel is not necessary unless a divergence of those inter-
ests arises.”27
19. 603 S.W.3d 53, 53 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).
20. Id. at 62.
21. Id. at 58.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. (citing Nat’l Med. Enters. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 132 (Tex. 1996) (orig.
proceeding)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 57–58.
27. Id. at 59 (citing Respler ex rel. Magnum Hunter Res. Corp. v. Evans, 17 F. Supp.
3d 418, 421 (D. Del. 2014)).
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However, neither of the above stated views of the law were expressly
adopted by the supreme court. Rather, the supreme court said, “We an-
nounce no categorical rule governing dual representation in derivative
litigation.”28
Yet, even though the supreme court declined to “announce” a categori-
cal rule, it can be fairly said that the supreme court did, in fact, forge a
rule. That is because in the final stage of its analysis, the supreme court
stated that a conclusion respecting disqualification “requires considera-
tion of the true extent of their adversity under the circumstances” pursu-
ant to Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.06(a): “A
lawyer shall not represent opposing parties to the same litigation.”29 The
supreme court’s decision on this point appears to be very similar to the
Delaware court’s rule.
Finally, using its stated measure, the supreme court concluded there
was no disqualifying conflict and explained:
Stripped of the conceptual and procedural baggage of its “deriva-
tive” claims, this case is about who controls the management of BBT
. . . Either the Hickman Group is right, in which case its interests and
BBT’s are truly aligned, or the Murrin Group is right, in which case
BBT is aligned with it instead.30
Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the motion to
disqualify, mandamus relief was denied.31
Before concluding, the supreme court addressed the Murrin Group’s
contention that the trial court erred in denying their Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 12 Motion (Rule 12 Motion) to show authority.32 The
Murrin Group claimed that their opponents had no authority to choose
legal counsel to represent the LLC based upon the language of the gov-
erning documents.33 Not surprising was the fact that the real parties in
interest interpreted the documents differently.
Relators argued they were harmed in three ways.34 First, they were
harmed by the denial of their contractual rights to choose counsel. Sec-
ond, at trial, the jury would be confused by counsel representing both the
LLC and their adversaries. Third, the LLC was funding the opposition’s
legal fees. The supreme court dispensed with those alleged harms by con-
cluding these issues can be addressed by the trial court.35 The supreme
court concluded, “Under these circumstances, the relators have not estab-
28. Id.
29. Id.; see also TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06 cmt. 6 (defining
the term “directly adverse”).
30. In re Murrin Brothers 1885, Ltd., 603 S.W.3d at 60.
31. Id. at 61.
32. Id.; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 12 (“A party in a suit or proceeding pending in a court of
this state may, by sworn written motion stating that he believes the suit or proceeding is
being prosecuted or defended without authority, cause the attorney to be cited to appear
before the court and show his authority to act.”).
33. In re Murrin Brothers 1885, Ltd., 603 S.W.3d at 61.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 61–62.
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lished the lack of an adequate remedy if mandamus relief is not granted.
Accordingly, mandamus relief as to the Rule 12 motion is denied.”36 The
element of “abuse of discretion” was not addressed by the supreme court
as to the Rule 12 Motion.37
The supreme court prefaced its final remarks about the denial of the
petition for writ of mandamus with a bit of historical color. It expressed
comfort that dispute resolution has advanced to court trials and away
from the days of the Wild West when the means of settling a “family feud
over a dance hall and saloon in the Fort Worth Stockyards” might have
been by a gun battle of six-shooters.38 Finally, the supreme court ob-
served that the denial of mandamus relief allows this dispute to proceed
toward a more peaceful alternative where the parties are represented by
their chosen lawyers.39
C. HEALTHCARE CASE DISCOVERY OF NON-PARTY PHYSICIAN
In the case of In re Turner,40 the Texas Supreme Court considered the
limits on discovery under the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA).41
Generally, in a healthcare liability claim case, no discovery is permitted
until the claimant serves an expert report on the physician or provider
against whom the claim is asserted, in accordance with the TMLA.42 In
this case, the claimant sued one healthcare provider and served an expert
report meeting the TMLA’s requirements on that provider. However, the
claimant sought to depose another physician who was not a named party
to the suit regarding the same underlying incident. When the non-party
physician was served with a subpoena duces tecum, he objected, claiming
this process was no more than pre-suit discovery, which is prohibited
under the TMLA.43 The Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals agreed in part
with the physician holding such an expert report must be served on the
non-party deponent before the discovery proceeds and granted manda-
mus relief.44 The supreme court disagreed with the court of appeals and
conditionally granted mandamus relief.45 In so doing, the supreme court
recited the general rules of discovery and commented that:
[A] party may obtain discovery regarding any matter that is not priv-
ileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action . . .
We see nothing in the [TMLA] indicating that the Legislature in-
tended to deprive a claimant of legitimate, and possibly crucial, dis-
covery of information in aid of a health care liability claim for which




40. 591 S.W.3d 121, 121 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).
41. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.001–.050.
42. In re Turner, 591 S.W.3d at 122.
43. Id. at 123; see In re Jordan, 249 S.W.3d 416, 419–20, 424 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceed-
ing); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.351(s).
44. In re Turner, 591 S.W.3d at 124.
45. See In re Jordan, 249 S.W.3d at 127.
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a statutorily compliant expert report has been served.46
However, in granting mandamus relief, the supreme court sent the case
back to the trial court for management of the process and directed that:
[I]n conducting Dr. Sandate’s deposition and seeking relief from the
trial court regarding disagreements over the propriety of specific
questions, the parties are governed by the parameters set forth in
this opinion. With respect to the subpoena duces tecum, the parties
may present argument to the trial court as to the permissible scope
of document production in light of those same parameters.47
In rendering its decision, the supreme court did not directly address the
“adequacy of the appellate” remedy. It merely stated the general rule
that mandamus will be allowed only when “the relator shows that the
trial court abused its discretion and that no adequate appellate remedy
exists.”48
D. VENUE IN LIMITED PARTNER’S SUIT TO REMOVE GENERAL
PARTNER
The case of In re Fox River Real Estate Holdings, Inc.49 involved two
mandatory venue provisions that, at first blush, appear to be in conflict.
The underlying suit arose from allegations of wrongful disposition of a
limited partnership’s assets. A group of limited partners sued the owner
of the general partner and the general partner claiming they fraudulently
misappropriated valuable groundwater leases and other assets, breached
the limited partnership agreement, and violated fiduciary duties owed to
the partnership. The limited partners sought actual damages in excess of
$1 million, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and expenses, and declar-
atory, injunctive, and other equitable relief.50
The venue conflict arose because one statute, § 15.020 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, permits parties in a “major transac-
tion” to contractually agree to venue for related disputes.51 The other,
§ 65.023(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, “mandates
venue in a defendant’s county of domicile for cases purely or primarily
seeking injunctive relief.”52
Suit was filed in Washington County, which was the domicile of the
defendants. However, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to trans-
fer venue to Harris County based on the venue-selection clause in the
partnership agreement. The limited partners sought mandamus to compel
venue in Washington County, but the Fourteenth Houston Court of Ap-
46. In re Turner, 591 S.W.3d at 126 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 127.
48. Id. at 124.
49. 596 S.W.3d 759, 759 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding).
50. Id. at 761.
51. Id.; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.020.
52. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 65.023(a).
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peals denied relief.53
The Texas Supreme Court observed that § 15.020 is a venue provision
that controls only over other mandatory venue provisions in Title 2 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.54 However, it does not control
over a venue statute outside of Title 2.55 Accordingly, the supreme court
considered whether § 65.023(a), found in Title 3, was applicable.56
First, the supreme court identified the language of § 65.023(a) upon
which its decision should be based: “[A] writ of injunction against a party
who is a resident of this state shall be tried in a district or county court in
the county in which the party is domiciled.”57 Then, the supreme court
observed that § 65.023(a) is “operative only when a plaintiff’s pleadings
in the underlying suit establish the relief sought is ‘purely or primarily
injunctive.’”58 The supreme court emphasized, “In this context, ‘primary’
necessarily means first in order of rank or importance.”59 Finally, it re-
viewed the litany of claims and relief sought,60 employing what it called a
“commonsense examination of the substance of . . . [the] claims for re-
lief,”61 and concluding the limited partners’ “requests for injunctive relief
are not the dominant purpose or central focus of the lawsuit.”62 Ade-
quacy of any remedy by appeal was not addressed since that is not a pre-
requisite to mandamus relief in mandatory venue cases.63
E. TIMELY DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTY
In In re Mobile Mini, Inc., Mobile Mini sought mandamus relief to
compel “the trial court to grant its timely filed motion to designate a re-
sponsible third party in a construction worker’s personal-injury suit.”64
The motion was filed after the statute of limitations expired on the
worker’s claims against the third party. However, Mobile Mini
contended:
[T]he trial court was obligated to grant it because (1) the motion was
filed more than sixty days before a trial setting, (2) the responsible
third party was timely disclosed in response to the worker’s discov-
53. In re Fox River Real Est. Holdings, Inc., 596 S.W.3d at 762.
54. Id. at 764.
55. Id.; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.020(d) (“This section does not
apply to an action if . . . (3) venue is established under a statute of this state other than this
title.”).
56. In re Fox River Real Est. Holdings, Inc., 596 S.W.3d at 765–66.
57. Id. at 765 n.35 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 65.023(a) ); see In re Cont’l
Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (“The statute placing
venue for injunction suits in the county of the defendant’s domicile is mandatory.”).
58. In re Fox River Real Est. Holdings, Inc., 596 S.W.3d at 765.
59. Id.
60. Id. (“The crux of this dispute is whether Fox River ‘primarily’ seeks injunctive
relief despite pleading for significant damages, attorney’s fees, declaratory relief, and other
equitable relief, including a constructive trust.”).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 763 n.18.
64. In re Mobile Mini, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 781, 783 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004).
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ery requests, and (3) the worker did not challenge the sufficiency of
the factual allegations concerning the third party’s alleged
responsibility.65
The plaintiff sued Mobile Mini and other defendants nineteen days
before the statute of limitations expired on his tort claims. Mobile Mini
was served at that time with discovery requests in addition to the original
petition.66 It timely filed its answer to the suit and responses to the dis-
covery requests. The discovery responses included the identification of
the third party whom Mobile Mini would later move to designate as a
responsible third party. However, the statute of limitations on the tort
claim had run by that time.67
When Mobile Mini moved to designate the responsible third party, the
plaintiff opposed the motion on the ground that, according to Texas Civil
Practice & Remedy Code § 33.004(d), the third party could not be a re-
sponsible party once the limitations period had expired.68 Further, plain-
tiff contended that even though Mobile Mini served its discovery
responses timely, the statute of limitations had run by that time, it could
no longer sue the third party, and Mobile Mini could have served its re-
sponses before the statute of limitations ran. The trial court agreed with
the plaintiff and the Thirteenth Corpus Christi–Edinburg Court of Ap-
peals denied mandamus relief.69
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with Mobile Mini that, on this re-
cord, § 33.004(d) did not prohibit designation of the third party. That is
because Mobile Mini timely filed its discovery responses.70 It had no obli-
gation to count the days left before the limitations period ran and file the
responses within that time.71 The supreme court reasoned:
[T]he circumstances presented here do not invoke the gamesmanship
concerns section 33.004(d) operates to prevent. Mobile Mini identi-
fied Nolana as a responsible third party in its initial response to Co-
varrubias’s initial request for disclosures and that response was
timely under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Because Covarru-
bias waited almost two years to sue Mobile Mini, the response dead-
line for the disclosures fell after limitations expired. Mobile Mini did
not engage in any dilatory or stall tactics to game the system, but
instead filed the discovery response when it was due, and Covarru-
bias does not contend the response was inadequate. Mobile Mini’s




68. Id.; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004(d) (“A defendant may not des-
ignate a person as a responsible third party with respect to a claimant’s cause of action
after the applicable limitations period on the cause of action has expired with respect to
the responsible third party if the defendant has failed to comply with its obligations, if any,
to timely disclose that the person may be designated as a responsible third party under the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
69. In re Mobile Mini, Inc., 596 S.W.3d at 783–84.
70. See id. at 784.
71. See id.
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the natural consequence of Covarubbias’s decision to wait to file suit
until limitations were nearing terminus.72
The supreme court made clear that Mobile Mini met its burden to secure
mandamus relief by stating, “Mobile Mini is entitled to mandamus relief
because the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mobile Mini’s mo-
tion and Mobile Mini lacks an adequate appellate remedy.”73
F. TRIAL COURT’S PLENARY POWER TO VACATE AN ORDER
GRANTING A MOTION TO DISMISS—TEXAS CITIZENS
PARTICIPATION ACT
The issue in the case of In re Panchakarla74 was whether the “Texas
Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) prohibits a trial court from exercising
its plenary power to vacate an order granting a motion to dismiss.”75 Cen-
tral to the resolution of this dispute is the TCPA’s deadline for ruling on a
motion to dismiss. Section 27.005(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Rem-
edy Code requires the trial court to rule on a TCPA dismissal motion
“not later than the 30th day following the date the hearing on the motion
concludes.”76 If the trial court does not issue a timely ruling, § 27.008(a)
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedy Code provides “the motion is
considered to have been denied by operation of law and the moving party
may appeal.”77 An interlocutory appeal is also authorized from the trial
court’s timely denial of a dismissal motion.78 An interlocutory appeal
from denial of a TCPA motion automatically stays all trial court proceed-
ings.79 However, should the trial court grant the motion to dismiss, an
appeal may be taken as with any final judgment.80
The Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals “held that the trial court had no
power to vacate its own order [granting the motion to dismiss] after the
72. Id. at 785.
73. Id. at 783–84.
74. 602 S.W.3d 536, 536 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
75. Id. at 538.
76. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(a) (“The court must rule on a mo-
tion under Section 27.003 not later than the 30th day following the date the hearing on the
motion concludes.”).
77. Id. § 27.008(a) (“If a court does not rule on a motion to dismiss under Section
27.003 in the time prescribed by Section 27.005, the motion is considered to have been
denied by operation of law and the moving party may appeal.”).
78. Id. § 51.014(a)(12) (“(a) A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a
district court, county court at law, statutory probate court, or county court that: . . . (12)
denies a motion to dismiss filed under Section 27.003 . . .”).
79. Id. § 51.014(b).
80. Id. (“An interlocutory appeal under Subsection (a), other than an appeal under
Subsection (a)(4) or in a suit brought under the Family Code, stays the commencement of
a trial in the trial court pending resolution of the appeal. An interlocutory appeal under
Subsection (a)(3), (5), (8), or (12) also stays all other proceedings in the trial court pending
resolution of that appeal.”); see also In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d at 538 (explaining that
under the TCPA “if granting the motion does not resolve the entire controversy, the order
is interlocutory and unappealable unless made final by severance”).
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statutory deadline for ruling on the motion had expired.”81 The Texas
Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals and it conditionally
granted mandamus.82
The supreme court reasoned that “trial courts retain plenary power
over their judgments until they are final.”83 The only constraint the su-
preme court found in the TCPA was that interlocutory orders denying a
TCPA motion to dismiss are immediately appealable and when perfected,
an appeal stays all trial court proceedings until the appeal is concluded.84
However, the supreme court observed the statute is silent as to the trial
court’s authority to reconsider “either a timely issued ruling granting a
TCPA motion to dismiss or a timely order denying such a motion when
no interlocutory appeal is pending.”85
The supreme court concluded that, even though nothing in the statute
prohibits a trial court from vacating its own orders when they have ple-
nary power to do so, the effect of the trial court vacating the dismissal
order in this instance provides the basis for an interlocutory appeal.86 The
supreme court summarized,
Here, once the trial court vacated its February 22 order, as it had
authority to do, no ruling on the dismissal motion was in place. Ac-
cordingly, the motion to dismiss was either overruled by operation of
law for want of a timely ruling . . . or denied by the trial court in a
new trial. In this procedural posture, we need not consider whether
the trial court’s order granting a new trial restarted the trial clock
and permitted a new hearing and ruling on the dismissal motion, be-
cause even if it did not, the same result ensues. Whether the trial
court properly denied the defendants’ TCPA motion or whether it
was overruled by operation of law on vacatur of the prior order, the
defendants can seek relief by interlocutory appeal as the Legislature
contemplated.87
The supreme court determined that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion. Accordingly, mandamus was conditionally granted as to the deci-
sion of the court of appeals.88
G. MINISTERIAL DUTY TO PAY WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT
COMPENSATION—TIM COLE ACT
A somewhat novel original proceeding mandamus case, In re Lester,89
addressed compensation for a wrongfully convicted person under the Tim
81. In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d at 538 (citing In re Hartley, 599 S.W.3d 574, 577
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.), mand. granted, In re Panchakarla,
602 S.W.3d 536 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)).
82. Id.
83. See id. at 539; TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a; TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1.
84. In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d at 540.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 541.
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. Id.
89. 602 S.W.3d 469, 469 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding).
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Cole Act.90 The Texas Supreme Court described the case as “an egre-
gious case of the criminal-justice system gone wrong.”91 The only ques-
tion in the case was whether relator Colton Lester was entitled to
wrongful-imprisonment compensation under the Tim Cole Act.92
In 2014, seventeen-year-old Lester attempted to sexually proposition a
minor by text message. Lester was charged with attempted online solicita-
tion of a minor under § 33.021(b) of the Texas Penal Code, a third-degree
felony, even though the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had already
declared the statute unconstitutional. Unaware that his prosecution was
illegal, Lester pleaded guilty to the charge and received a five-year de-
ferred adjudication sentence.93 Later, Lester’s probation was revoked, he
was sentenced to three years in prison, and ultimately served two years in
prison before obtaining relief by writ of habeas corpus. After his release,
Lester applied for compensation under the Tim Cole Act, which was de-
nied twice.94
According to the plain language of the Texas Civil Practice and Reme-
dies Code, the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts has a purely minis-
terial duty to determine eligibility for Tim Cole Act compensation.95
However, if compensation is denied, a challenge to that denial may be
brought exclusively before the supreme court by an action for
mandamus.96
The supreme court concluded the Comptroller had a ministerial duty to
declare Lester entitled to compensation “because the conduct for which
he was imprisoned was not a crime at any time during his criminal pro-
ceedings.”97 Accordingly, the supreme court conditionally granted Les-
ter’s petition for writ of mandamus.98 Because the Comptroller’s duty
was ministerial, it was unnecessary for the supreme court to evaluate
whether there was an adequate remedy by appeal.99
90. Id. at 471; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 103.001–103.154.
91. In re Lester, 602 S.W.3d at 471.
92. Id. at 471 n.1 (“The Tim Cole Act is codified in Chapter 103 of the Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 103.001–.154. The chap-
ter is titled ‘Compensation to Persons Wrongfully Imprisoned,’ but since 2009, the statute
has been known as the Tim Cole Act. See Act of May 27, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 180, § 1,
2009 TEX. GEN. LAWS 523 (‘This Act shall be known as the Tim Cole Act.’). Tim Cole died
of an asthma attack in 1999 while incarcerated for aggravated sexual assault. DNA evi-
dence later cleared Cole of the charges, and in 2010, Cole received the State’s first posthu-
mous pardon. See In re Smith, 333 S.W.3d 582, 583 n.1 (Tex. 2011).”).
93. Id. at 471.
94. Id.
95. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 103.051(b)(1), (b-1).
96. Id. § 103.051(d)–(e); see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(c) (providing that only
the Texas Supreme Court has authority to issue writs of mandamus against executive of-
ficers of the state); In re Smith, 333 S.W.3d at 585.
97. In re Lester, 602 S.W.3d at 471.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 475. In performing its designated functions, the supreme court may issue
writs of mandamus or grant other relief as necessary to compel officials to perform nondis-
cretionary acts when the law so requires. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.002(c); see also In re
Phillips, 496 S.W.3d 769, 770–71 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (explaining that mandamus
is available to compel performance of ministerial duty of Texas Comptroller).
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H. FAMILY LAW TRIAL COURT AWARDED VISITATION RIGHTS TO
UNRELATED NON-PARENT
In re C.J.C.100 is a case of first impression in family law respecting
whether “[t]he presumption that the best interest of the child is served by
awarding custody to [a] parent” applies in a custody modification pro-
ceeding.101 In its analysis, the supreme court referred to In re V.L.K. and
noted that “the Legislature codified the presumption in Chapter 153 of
the Family Code, which governs only original custody determinations.”102
In that regard, the supreme court observed that Texas Family Code
§ 156.101(a) provides that any person who seeks to modify an existing
custody order must show (1) changed circumstances, and (2) that modifi-
cation would be a positive improvement for the child.103 Chapter 156 of
the Texas Family Code does not provide for a parental presumption in
modification suits.104
The supreme court concluded that the presumption found in Texas
Family Code § 153.131(a) must also be applied in modification of custody
matters in light of the direction by the United States Supreme Court in
Troxel v. Granville.105 In that case, the Supreme Court declared unconsti-
tutional a trial court’s order requiring a fit parent to permit visitation with
her children’s grandparents.106
In re C.J.C, the trial court award allowed the natural mother’s boy-
friend, with whom she and the child lived until her untimely death, to
have visitation and overnight possession rights.107 However, the award
was made over the objection of the child’s natural father and possessory
conservator. The natural father had not married the child’s mother, was
estranged from the mother at the time of her death, and was not alleged
to be nor found to be unfit.108
The particular ruling reviewed by the supreme court was the following
statement from the record, “The court has determined what is in [the
child’s] best interest, and you, [the natural father] are to make this as
agreeable as you can . . . force yourself to do.”109 The supreme court
concluded the statutes applicable to the trial court’s decision reflected
“exactly the opposite” of a parental presumption.110 Further, the su-
100. 603 S.W.3d 804, 807 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding).
101. Id. at 807 n.4 (citing In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex. 2000) (orig.
proceeding)).
102. In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d at 341; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(a) (“[U]nless the
court finds that the appointment of the parent or parents would not be in the best interest
of the child because the appointment would significantly impair the child’s physical health
or emotional development, a parent shall be appointed sole managing conservator or both
parents shall be appointed as joint managing conservators of the child.”).
103. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 813.
104. Id. at 810–11 (citing In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d at 343).
105. Id. at 807–08.
106. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 61, 72 (2000).
107. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 810.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 815.
110. Id.
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preme court concluded the trial court improperly placed on a fit parent
“the burden of disproving that visitation would be in the best interest of
[his child].”111
The supreme court conditionally granted mandamus relief concluding
that “previously [we] have granted relief to require a trial court to vacate
orders erroneously permitting nonparents access to a child over a fit par-
ent’s objection.”112 Further, the court said, “[W]e conclude that a court
must apply the presumption that a fit parent—not the court—determines
the best interest of the child in any proceeding in which a nonparent
seeks conservatorship or access over the objection of a child’s fit
parent.”113
I. GOVERNOR’S EXECUTIVE ORDERS
In the case of In re Abbott,114 Governor Greg Abbott and the Texas
Attorney General sought a somewhat unusual mandamus review of a
trial court’s temporary restraining order that blocked Governor Abbott’s
Executive Order GA-13 (GA-13). That executive order suspended, dur-
ing the current COVID-19 pandemic, application of certain statutes au-
thorizing trial judges to release jail inmates with violent histories.115 The
plaintiffs in the trial court included sixteen Texas trial judges and certain
public interest organizations and lawyer associations. They alleged GA-13
was unconstitutional and exceeded the governor’s statutory emergency
powers because the order improperly interfered with judicial authority to
make individualized bail decisions. In the trial court, the plaintiffs re-
quested and were granted a temporary restraining order that blocked en-
forcement of GA-13 as it specifically applied to judges. None of the
plaintiffs were eligible as an inmate who could not obtain release because
of GA-13, and the plaintiffs did not identify any such person by name.116
In rendering conditional mandamus relief, the Texas Supreme Court
addressed the jurisdictional standing of the judges.117 The supreme court
noted that the “judicial plaintiffs have not alleged the personal, legally
111. Id. at 816.
112. Id. at 811. The supreme court cites to the following cases to support its proposition
that mandamus relief is appropriate in this context:
In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 334–35 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam ) (citing In re Mays-Hooper, 189 S.W.3d 777, 778 (Tex. 2006) (per
curiam) (noting parties’ agreement that mandamus relief is appropriate if the
trial court’s temporary orders granting possession of a child to a nonparent
were a clear abuse of discretion)); see Little v. Daggett, 858 S.W.2d 368, 369
(Tex. 1993) (per curiam) (granting mandamus relief to vacate trial court’s
temporary orders granting visitation in a suit to establish paternity); Dancy v.
Daggett, 815 S.W.2d 548, 549 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that manda-
mus was an appropriate remedy because “the trial court’s issuance of tempo-
rary orders [was] not subject to interlocutory appeal . . .”).
Id. at 811 n.27.
113. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 817.
114. 601 S.W.3d 802, 802 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
115. Id. at 805.
116. Id.
117. See id.
2021] Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions 317
cognizable injury required for standing.”118 Rather, “the judicial plaintiffs
sued to correct an alleged trespass by the executive branch on powers
assigned to the judiciary.”119 The supreme court concluded that the
judges did not have standing, but commented that other citizens may
have standing, specifically stating:
That does not mean the issues raised in this lawsuit are unimportant
or cannot be litigated. If a defendant in a bail hearing contends the
executive order is unconstitutional and the suspended statutes
should continue to provide the rule of decision, the judge has a duty
to rule on that issue, and the losing side can challenge that ruling.120
Finally, the supreme court determined that mandamus was the proper
remedy “[b]ecause temporary restraining orders are not appealable, the
Governor and Attorney General have no remedy by appeal.”121
J. ELECTION LAW ISSUES
It is no surprise that in 2020, an election year, the Texas Supreme Court
was presented with an array of election related issues. Five mandamus
opinions were released in the period from mid-July up to a few days
before the November 3 general election. Two of those petitions were dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction, two were denied, and one was granted.122
The subjects included whether: (1) candidates had complied with statu-
tory requirements to have their names placed on the ballot; (2) the Gov-
ernor’s executive orders could suspend Texas Election Code provisions
for the general election; and (3) the City of Houston could be stopped
from terminating its contract for use of its convention center by the Re-
publican Party of Texas for the Party’s 2020 State Convention.
1. In re Republican Party of Texas
This case123 concerns when the City of Houston and Houston First Cor-
poration (the owner and the operator, respectively, of the George R.
Brown Convention Center) terminated their contract with the Republi-
can Party of Texas (the Party) for the use of the Convention Center to
conduct the Party’s 2020 State Convention on July 8, 2020.124 The Con-
vention Center was to be used by the Party for the period of July 13–18.
118. Id. at 809.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 813 (citing In re Office of Attorney Gen., 257 S.W.3d 695, 698 (Tex. 2008)
(per curiam)).
122. See In re Republican Party of Tex., 605 S.W.3d 47, 48 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceed-
ing) (per curiam); In re Tex. Republican Caucus PAC, No. 20-0663, 2020 WL 5351318 (Tex.
Sept. 5, 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Hotze (Hotze I), No. 20-0430, 2020 WL
4046034 (Tex. July 17, 2020) (orig. proceeding); In re Green Party of Tex., No. 20-0708,
2020 WL 5580156 (Tex. Sept. 18, 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Hotze (Hotze
II), No. 20-0739, 2020 WL 5919726 (Tex. Oct. 7, 2020) (orig. proceeding).
123. In re Republican Party of Tex., 605 S.W.3d at 48 (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
(dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction).
124. Id. at 47.
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The City and Houston First claimed they could terminate the contract
based upon the COVID-19 pandemic pursuant to the contract’s force-
majeure clause. That clause provided, in part, that notice of termination
was required to be communicated “as soon as practicable, but no later
than [seven] calendar days after the occurrence of the cause relied
upon.”125
On Friday, July 10, the Party petitioned the Texas Supreme Court for
mandamus relief directing the City of Houston and Houston First Corpo-
ration “to perform their obligations in connection with the [Republican
Party’s] Convention, including performance of their contractual obliga-
tions, and performance of all legal obligations to ensure the free exercise
of association and assembly.”126 The Party contended, inter alia, that the
notice of termination was unfounded and motivated by the mayor’s polit-
ical views that were in opposition to those of the Party. The supreme
court requested for the City and Houston First to respond by the close of
business on Saturday, July 11, and, also, asked that the Solicitor General
tender his views.127
In its petition, the Party claimed § 273.061 of the Texas Election Code
gives the supreme court jurisdiction to “issue a writ of mandamus to com-
pel the performance of any duty imposed by law in connection with the
holding of an election or a political party convention, regardless of
whether the person responsible for performing the duty is a public of-
ficer.”128 However, the supreme court concluded it did not have jurisdic-
tion to address the petition.
The supreme court reasoned the obligation of Houston First claimed by
the Party is not a “duty imposed by law” referred to in § 273.061 of the
Texas Election Code.129 Such duties are “limited to [those] imposed by a
constitution, statute, city charter, or city ordinance.”130 The Party did not
assert that Houston First owed it any such duty. Rather, “[t]he Party ar-
gue[d] it ha[d] constitutional rights to hold a convention and engage in
electoral activities, and that [was] unquestionably true.”131 The supreme
court addressed that contention by observing, “[T]hose rights do not al-
low [the Party] to simply commandeer use of the Center.”132 The su-
preme court closed its majority per curiam opinion by commenting it
could not entertain the petition even though the Party made “troubling
factual allegations.”133
Justice Devine dissented,134 stating that the supreme court clearly had
jurisdiction over the case because “an essential purpose of the Election
125. Id. at 51 (Devine, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 48.
127. Id.
128. Id.; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 273.061 (emphasis added).





134. Id. at 48–54.
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Code’s grant of mandamus jurisdiction . . . is to ensure the smooth func-
tioning of the electoral process against last-minute threats to the integrity
of that process.”135 Further, Justice Devine observed “[t]he practical real-
ity is that running an election and associated political conventions in-
volves a host of legal obligations imposed upon many private and public
parties by the constitution, statutes, and contracts.”136 Having lashed to-
gether the contractual rights of the Party with its legal obligations in the
political process, Justice Devine opined the contract between the Party
and Houston First was a “duty imposed by law in connection with the
holding of an election or a political party convention.”137 Accordingly,
Justice Devine concluded that the supreme court had jurisdiction to com-
pel the performance of the contract by issuance of a writ of mandamus
pursuant to Texas Election Code § 273.061.138
2. In re Texas House Republican Caucus PAC
In this case,139 several Republican Party candidates and organizations
filed a petition for writ of mandamus to prevent forty-four Libertarian
Party candidates from appearing on the 2020 general election ballot.140
The claim was that those candidates did not qualify for placement on the
ballot since they failed to pay the filing fee required by § 141.041 of the
Texas Election Code. The Republicans conceded the statutory deadline
to have the Libertarians removed from the ballot using a declaration of
ineligibility passed on August 21, before their petition was filed.141 They
claimed a later deadline applied to their petition, which they described as
a challenge to the Libertarians’ ballot applications governed by the dead-
line in § 141.034 of the Texas Election Code.142
The Texas Supreme Court denied the petition because “the Libertarian
Party nominates candidates by convention rather than primary election
[and] its candidates’ applications are governed by [C]hapter 181 of the
Election Code, not by [C]hapter 141’s procedures.”143 Further, the relief
sought challenges “‘an application for a place on the ballot’ under
[C]hapter 141, but Libertarian Party candidates do not file such applica-
tions. Instead, they file ‘an application for nomination by convention’
under [C]hapter 181, which is a statutorily separate type of application
governed by a separate set of statutes.”144 So, having no basis for its
prayer for mandamus, the petition of the Caucus was dismissed.145
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 49–50.
138. Id. at 51.
139. In re Tex. House Republican Caucus PAC, No. 20-0663, 2020 WL 5351318, at *1
(Tex. Sept. 5, 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
140. Id.
141. Id.; see TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 145.035.
142. In re Tex. House Republican Caucus PAC, 2020 WL 5351318, at *5.
143. Id. at *1.
144. Id. at *1–2.
145. Id. at *2.
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3. In re Hotze (Hotze I)
Here,146 without comment, the Texas Supreme Court dismissed the pe-
tition. However, Justice Devine explained in his concurrence the dilemma
of the supreme court, in this way:
The challenged orders in this case, which temporarily suspend the
right of nonessential business owners to make a living, were issued
by the Governor under Chapter 418 of the Texas Government Code.
Relators here challenge these orders on multiple grounds. They do
so through an original mandamus petition, naming the Governor as
the real party in interest. I doubt, however, that this is the proper
vehicle to make such a challenge.147
As pointed out by Justice Devine, the immovable obstacle to this peti-
tion was the Texas constitution, which provides that “the Legislature ‘may
confer original jurisdiction on the supreme court to issue writs . . . of
mandamus in such cases as may be specified, except as against the Gover-
nor of the State.’”148 The Texas Government Code § 22.002(a) provides
the same exception.149 Nevertheless, while he acknowledges the petition
must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, Justice Devine said he
“share[s] Relators’ concerns” about improper delegation of authority to
the governor.150
Further, Justice Devine did not agree with the state’s argument that the
Governor’s powers to issue emergency orders under the Texas Disaster
Act of 1975 is a constitutional delegation of powers.151 He made clear his
view that the supreme court had decided long ago that Texas constitution
article I, § 28152 “does not permit the Legislature to ‘delegate to a munici-
pal corporation or to anyone else, authority to suspend a statute law of
the State.’”153 No path to reconcile this quandary was suggested by the
concurrence.
4. In re Green Party of Texas
In this case,154 the Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted manda-
mus relief, setting aside the mandamus relief granted by the Third Austin
Court of Appeals.155 The controversy began on August 17, 2020, when
certain Democratic candidates presented the Green Party co-chairs with
146. In re Hotze (Hotze I), No. 20-0430, 2020 WL 4046034, at *1 (Tex. July 17, 2020)
(orig. proceeding) (pet. dismissed for want of jurisdiction) (Devine, J., concurring).
147. Id. at *2.
148. Id.; TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3(a) (emphasis added).
149. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a).
150. Hotze I, 2020 WL 4046034, at *3.
151. Id.
152. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 28 (“Sec. 28. Suspension of Laws. No power of suspending
laws in this State shall be exercised except by the Legislature.”).
153. Hotze I, 2020 WL 4046034, at *5 (quoting Brown Cracker & Candy Co. v. City of
Dall., 137 S.W. 342, 343 (Tex. 1910)) (emphasis added).
154. In re Green Party of Tex., No. 20-0708, 2020 WL 5580156, at *1 (Tex. Sept. 18,
2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
155. Id.
2021] Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions 321
public records showing Green Party candidates, seeking the same posi-
tions as the Democratic candidates, had not paid their filing fees.
According to the Democratic candidates, because filing fees had not
been paid, the Green Party chairs had a ministerial duty to declare those
Green Party candidates ineligible.156 The Green Party chairs refused to
declare the candidates ineligible. The deadline for filing was on August
21, 2020.
On August 17, the same day as when the demand was made, the Demo-
cratic candidates in the court of appeals filed a petition for mandamus
relief.157 The court of appeals held that the Green Party candidates were
ineligible to be candidates on the November ballot based on their failure
to pay the filing fee. The court of appeals concluded that when the co-
chairs were presented with the public record conclusively establishing this
failure, they had a “statutory duty” under § 145.003 of the Texas Election
Code to declare the Green Party candidates ineligible.158 On August 19,
that court of appeals conditionally granted relief and directed the co-
chairs to declare the Green Party candidates ineligible to appear as the
Green Party nominees and to take all steps within their authority to en-
sure that the candidates’ names did not appear on the ballot. Chief Justice
Rose dissented, stating that “mandamus relief [was] not appropriate
based on the record before [the court].”159
Then, on September 11, the Green Party relators filed a petition for
mandamus relief at the supreme court, requesting the mandamus relief
granted by the court of appeals be “rescinded.”160 The supreme court
considered the statutory framework that directed what candidates must
do in order to be placed on the ballot.161 Then, in a per curiam opinion,
the supreme court observed, “A candidate’s name is to be omitted from
the ballot if the candidate is declared ineligible on or before the seventy-
fourth day before election day, which was August 21 this year.”162 How-
ever, the demand for removal of the Green Party candidates was made on
August 17 and the court of appeals rendered its decision on August 19.
The supreme court identified the flaw in the court of appeals’ decision as
follows, “In the absence of recognizing a deadline for paying the filing fee
or giving the candidates an opportunity to comply, the court of appeals
erred in ordering the Green Party candidates removed from the ballot on
August 19.”163
Then, the supreme court moved on to grant affirmative relief.164 It ex-
156. Id. at *1–2.
157. Id. at *1.
158. Id. at *2.
159. Id. at *3; In re Davis, 607 S.W.3d 862, 866 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, orig. proceed-
ing), mand. granted, In re Green Party of Tex., No. 20-0708, 2020 WL 5580156 (Tex. Sept.
18, 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
160. In re Green Party of Tex., 2020 WL 5580156, at *1.
161. Id.
162. Id. at *9.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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plained that the Green Party candidates could be placed on the ballot
stating:
Because the August 21 deadline to remove a candidate from the bal-
lot due to ineligibility has passed, removal from the ballot is no
longer a remedy . . . [The] amici assert that this case is moot, arguing
that it is too late to add or delete names from the ballot. However,
the Secretary of State has indicated that changes to the ballot are not
precluded by statute and relief is still possible.165
The supreme court continued:
We recognize that changes to the ballot at this late point in the pro-
cess will require extra time and resources to be expended by our
local election officials. But a candidate’s access to the ballot is an
important value to our democracy . . . And an added expense is not a
sufficient justification to deny these candidates that access.166
The reasoning of this decision is worthy of further comment. First, the
supreme court focused on the obvious, that the August 17 demand and
refusal were premature since the deadline for filing was August 21.167 The
supreme court recognized that the court of appeals overlooked the fact
that the candidates had plenty of time to pay the filing fees and incor-
rectly concluded the candidates were disqualified.168 Therefore, the su-
preme court determined the chairs had no “ministerial duty” to disqualify
the candidates at the time the demand was made.
Second, it was obvious by the time the petition was filed at the supreme
court on September 11 (well after the August 21 deadline) that the issue
was not simply whether the court of appeals ruled correctly. The broader
issue was whether the status of the candidates should be restored. The
supreme court recognized that the court of appeals did not provide the
candidates with an opportunity to “cure.”169 However, in declaring the
case was not moot and the candidates should be reinstated, the supreme
court recalled its decision in In re Francis, where the opportunity to cure
was determined to be required by the Constitution.170 The supreme court
then concluded that a candidate’s “access to the ballot lies at the very
heart of a constitutional republic.”171
165. Id. at *9–10.
166. Id. (citations omitted).
167. Id. at *8.
168. Id.
169. Id. at *9.
170. Id. (citing In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d 534, 542 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding)). How-
ever, early in its opinion in In re Francis, the Texas Supreme Court notably concluded,
The Constitution requires that access to the electorate be real, not “merely
theoretical.” As we have noted many times in recent years, provisions that
restrict the right to hold office must be strictly construed against ineligibility.
Construing the Election Code’s silence in favor of an opportunity to cure
avoids potential constitutional problems that might be implicated if access to
the ballot was unnecessarily restricted.
In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d at 542.
171. In re Green Party of Tex., 2020 WL 5580156, at *10.
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5. In re Hotze (Hotze II)
In this case,172 decided by the Texas Supreme Court in its opinion
dated October 7, 2020, a petition for writ of mandamus sought relief from
another one of the Governor’s emergency orders issued pursuant to the
Texas Disaster Act of 1975.173 The petition filing followed on the heels of
the dismissal of Hotze I by the supreme court’s opinion delivered July 17,
2020.174 Other named relators in this case included the Republican Party
of Texas, voters, candidates, and current and former state officials.
The specific relief sought was to require the Texas Secretary of State to
conduct the November 3 general election according to two statutory pro-
visions that were suspended by the Governor’s July 27 proclamation.175
Relief was not requested against the Governor. Perhaps, that route was
not taken because of the education the relators received from Justice De-
vine’s concurrence in Hotze I about the impropriety of seeking manda-
mus against the Governor.176
When the supreme court disposed of Hotze II, it did not outright dis-
miss for want of jurisdiction as it had in Hotze I. Rather, the majority
denied mandamus relief because of the relators’ “delay” in bringing the
action.177 The majority did not touch on the merits of the relators’ claim
that the Secretary of State should be compelled to ignore the Governor’s
proclamation. However, in denying mandamus relief, the supreme court
identified facts that demonstrated relators’ delay, including waiting to file
the petition until September 23, ten weeks after the issuance of the proc-
lamation, receipt of mail-in ballots in Harris County began on September
24, and had relators sought relief in lower courts where there could have
been “a careful, thorough consideration of their arguments regarding the
Act’s scope and constitutionality.”178 The majority’s conclusion that the
relators’ delay justified denial of relief was capped with this statement,
“When the record fails to show that petitioners have acted diligently to
protect their rights, relief by mandamus is not available.”179
A concurrence authored by Justice Blacklock and joined by Justice
Busby agreed to the denial of the petition.180 However, they made it clear
that “delay” was not the lynchpin of the refusal to grant the petition. The
172. In re Hotze (Hotze II), No. 20-0739, 2020 WL 5919726, *1 (Tex. Oct. 7, 2020) (orig.
proceeding) (pet. denied).
173. Id.; see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 418.001–.261.
174. See Hotze I, No. 20-0430, 2020 WL 4046034, *1–2 (Tex. July 17, 2020) (orig. pro-
ceeding). The named party in the style of the Hotze I case was Steven Hotze, M.D, also the
named party in Hotze II. Hotze II, 2020 WL 5919726, at *1.
175. Hotze II, 2020 WL 5919726, at *1; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 85.001(a), 86.006(a-
1).
176. Hotze II, 2020 WL 5919726, at *1–2; TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3(a) (The Texas consti-
tution provides that the Legislature “may confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme
Court to issue writs of . . . mandamus in such cases as may be specified, except as against
the Governor of the State.”).
177. Hotze II, 2020 WL 5919726, at *2.
178. Id.
179. Id. at *3.
180. Id.
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concurrence described several possible grounds for dismissal of the peti-
tion for lack of standing.181
First, the concurrence considered that “[e]ven if the petitioners are in-
jured by the Governor’s adjustment of these statutory rules pursuant to
his emergency powers, that injury is not traceable to the Secretary of
State, who neither conducts early voting nor receives hand-delivered
mail-in ballots.”182 Second, “[b]ecause the Secretary does not implement
the laws in question and does not control whether local officials do so,
this Court ordering the Secretary to do or not do anything would not
change local officials’ obligation to implement the law in accordance with
the Governor’s proclamation.”183 Third, the petition did not show the
“challenged election activities will inflict a concrete and particularized in-
jury-in-fact on any of the petitioners.”184 The concurrence construed peti-
tioners’ interest as being that they “want their government to comply
with the law as they see it.”185
The concurring justices then cited two additional bases. First, there is
no legal basis for contending the Secretary of State can ignore the Gover-
nor’s proclamation even if ordered to do so by the supreme court.186 This
is because the Secretary’s title “chief election officer” is not “a delegation
of authority to care for any breakdown in the election process.”187 Sec-
181. Id. at *4.
182. Id. One may question what definition of “standing” the Texas Supreme Court fol-
lows. The opinion in Hotze II was delivered on October 7, 2020. However, on June 19,
2020, the same court wrestled with the concept of standing in the case of Pike v. Texas
EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 773–74 (Tex. 2020). In Pike, the supreme court said,
Like jurisdiction, standing “is a word of many, too many, meanings.” Texas
courts, having drawn upon the standing doctrine of our federal counterparts,
sometimes apply the label “standing” to statutory or prudential considera-
tions that “do not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction” but determine
whether a plaintiff “falls within the class of [persons] . . . authorized to sue”
or otherwise has “a valid . . . cause of action.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 (2014) (explaining why this use
of the standing label can be “misleading”). Yet we have been clear in this
century that the question whether a plaintiff has established his right “to go
forward with [his] suit” or “satisfied the requisites of a particular statute”
pertains “in reality to the right of the plaintiff to relief rather than to the
[subject-matter] jurisdiction of the court to afford it.” Dubai Petroleum Co.
v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76–77 (Tex. 2000). Thus, a plaintiff does not lack stand-
ing in its proper, jurisdictional sense “simply because he cannot prevail on
the merits of his claim; he lacks standing [when] his claim of injury is too
slight for a court to afford redress.” Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548
S.W.3d 477, 484–85 (Tex. 2018) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v Inman,
252 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Feb. 1, 2008)).
Id. (whether this is standing or simply a case where there is no merit since the Secretary
has no powers to curb).
183. Hotze II, 2020 WL 5919726, at *4 (Blacklock, J., concurring).
184. Id. at *9.
185. Id. at *9–10. The concurring Justices also cited the United States Supreme Court
for the proposition that “‘undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance
with the law does not confer standing.” Id. at *10 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560–61, 577 (1992)).
186. Id. at *14.
187. Id. (quoting Bullock v. Calvert, 480 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1972) (orig.
proceeding)).
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ond, and finally, those justices conclude the petition actually asks for no
more than an advisory opinion that would declare the Governor’s procla-
mation invalid.188
This case offers several points to ponder about the use of mandamus.
First, one might consider that the majority decided to sidestep the merits
by relying on the lapse of time or as Justice Devine refers to the holding
in his dissent, “laches or any similar doctrine.”189 The adequacy of the
remedy by appeal was not mentioned. One might assume that, in this
case, a finding of “delay” dispensed with the necessity of addressing the
traditional second element of mandamus.
Second, the majority equated delay with “lack of diligence” which, per-
haps, may be a revived, if not new, consideration for any mandamus case.
The support for the majority’s “lack of diligence” premise is a 1993 Texas
Supreme Court case, Rivercenter Associates v. Rivera.190 There, the su-
preme court concluded a relator lacked diligence in seeking mandamus to
compel a trial judge to enforce a contractual jury waiver.191 The supreme
court in Rivercenter concluded that the plaintiff waited over four months
after the filing of the defendants’ jury demand before asserting any rights
it may have had under the jury waiver provisions and the record did not
reveal any justification for this delay.192
Third, even though the Hotze II parties did not begin their efforts in a
lower court, the supreme court addressed the elements of mandamus re-
lief.193 However, the supreme court did not cite In re Prudential. Since In
re Prudential is the seminal case on mandamus, its absence is notable.
Instead of In re Prudential, the supreme court cited Walker v. Packer,194
the 1992 authority on mandamus, which In re Prudential clarified and re-
fined.195 Fourth, another interesting choice of authorities is evident in the
188. Id. “[O]ur separation of powers article, Tex. Const. art. II, § 1, prohibits courts
from issuing advisory opinions that decide abstract questions of law without binding the
parties.” Id. (Blacklock, J., concurring) (quoting Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex.
2001)).
189. Id.
190. 858 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding).
194. Hotze II, 2020 WL 5919726, at *4 n.20 (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833,
840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)).
195. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136–37. The Texas Supreme
Court wrote, “[t]he operative word, ‘adequate’, has no comprehensive definition; it is sim-
ply a proxy for the careful balance of jurisprudential considerations that determine when
appellate courts will use original mandamus proceedings to review the actions of lower
courts.” Id. at 136. Then, the supreme court referred to Walker v. Packer. “Thus, we wrote
in Walker v. Packer that ‘an appellate remedy is not inadequate merely because it may
involve more expense or delay than obtaining an extraordinary writ.’ While this is certainly
true, the word ‘merely’ carries heavy freight.” Id. In contrast with the reference to Walker,
the supreme court announced a “balance” should be used. Id. “An appellate remedy is
‘adequate’ when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.
When the benefits outweigh the detriments, appellate courts must consider whether the
appellate remedy is adequate.” Id.
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supreme court’s reference to Rivercenter. In re Prudential cited
Rivercenter for this proposition: “‘Mandamus,’ on the other hand, ‘is an
extraordinary remedy, not issued as a matter of right, but at the discre-
tion of the court. Although mandamus is not an equitable remedy, its
issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles.’”196 These observa-
tions merely demonstrate the apparent “rock solid” In re Prudential case
may not be immutable.
V. TEXAS SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO ADDRESSING
ADEQUATE REMEDY
The chart below summarizes how the Texas Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the “lack of adequate appellate remedy” element in mandamus
cases decided during the Survey period. The disparity in the supreme
court’s treatment of that critical element warrants a deeper look.
196. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 138.
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In re Abbott, 





Trial judges obtained 
TRO that blocked 
Governor’s emergency 
order suspending pre-
trial release for violent 
criminals. Judges lack 
standing. No adequate 
remedy since TRO’s are 
not appealable. 
Granted 





Child custody case of first 
impression where 
unrelated, non-parent 
granted custody over 
objection of natural 
father. The father was 
not ruled unfit. There 
was no adequate remedy 
by appeal because of 
custody decision. 
Granted 
 In re Mobile 






Timely filed motion to 
designate responsible 
third party denied by trial 
court. An adequate 
appellate remedy is 
lacking because allowing 
a case to proceed to trial 
without a properly 
requested responsible-
third-party designation 
would skew the 
proceedings, potentially 
affect the outcome of the 
litigation, and 
compromise the 
presentation of the 
relator’s defense. 
Granted 





Subject Matter of Case & 




 In re Turner, 




Court concluded Texas 
Civil Practice and 
Remedies Code § 74.001 
(Texas Medical Liability 
Act) does not prohibit 
the deposition and 
accompanying document 
production of a non-party 
medical services provider 
where claimant has not 
served an expert report 
on the provider whose 
deposition is sought. 
SCOTX held the Act 
does not require an 
expert opinion in this 
situation and granted 
mandamus against the 
COA. The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in 
allowing deposition 
without an expert report 
being issued. In re 
Prudential was expressly 
cited. 
Granted 
No statement as 










Texas Comptroller of 
Public Accounts has a 
purely ministerial duty to 
determine eligibility for 
Tim Cole Act 
compensation 
(wrongfully convicted 
persons). Adequacy of 
remedy is not an issue. 
Granted 
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In re Green 







Austin COA ordered 
Green Party chairs to 
disqualify candidates for 
failure to pay filing fees.  
SCOTX concluded COA 
erred and directed COA 














Participation Act does 
not prohibit a trial court 
from exercising its 
plenary power to vacate 
an order granting a 
motion to dismiss. 
SCOTX granted 
mandamus reversing 
COA’s mandamus relief. 
Adequacy of remedy 






because no abuse 
of discretion 
In re Fox River 
Real Estate 
Holdings, Inc., 




Venue dispute over 
applicability of Texas 
Civil Practice and 
Remedies Code, § 15.020 
as opposed to 
§ 65.023(a). No abuse of 
discretion since code 
provisions are not in 
conflict.  Section 
65.023(a) is inapplicable. 
Denied 





Subject Matter of Case & 











Republican Party of 
Texas, voters, candidates, 
and current and former 
state officials, sought 
mandamus relief to direct 
the Texas Secretary of 
State to conduct the 
November 3 general 
election according to 
existing statutory 
provisions and not in 
accordance with the 
Governor’s order that 
suspended some of those 
statutes.  Neither abuse 
of discretion nor the 
adequacy of the remedy 
by appeal were 
addressed. 
Denied 











organizations sought to 
prevent Libertarian Party 
candidates from 
appearing on the 2020 
general-election ballot 
due to the Libertarians’ 
failure to pay the filing 
fee. SCOTX determined 
Libertarians select 
candidates by convention 
not primary election so, 
Texas Election Code 
Chapter 141’s procedures 
for challenging ballot 
applications do not apply.
Denied 
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no abuse of 
discretion. 
In re Murrin 
Bros. 1885, 
Ltd., 603 
S.W.3d 53 (Tex. 
2019) (orig. 
proceeding). 
In case where trial court 
denied motion to 
disqualify counsel, 
SCOTX concluded none 




claims alleged by relator 
where that they have 
been denied contractual 
rights to veto litigation 
counsel, the jury will be 
confused and prejudiced 
against the involvement 
of opposing counsel, and 
payment of opposing 
counsel’s legal bills by 















The Governor was 
named as the real party 
in interest. Texas 
Government Code 
§ 22.002 provides 
mandamus actions may 
be commenced “against 
. . . any officer of state 
government except the 
governor.” Accordingly, 
the petition was 
dismissed. Justice Devine 
concurred in the 
dismissal and explained 
the above basis for the 
jurisdictional holding. 
Dismissed 
for want of 
jurisdiction. 
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 In re 
Republican 
Party of Tex., 





Party invokes § 273.061 
of the Texas Election 
Code, to “issue a writ of 
mandamus to compel the 
performance of any duty 
imposed by law in 
connection with the 
holding of an election or 
a political party 
convention, regardless of 
whether the person 
responsible for 
performing the duty is a 
public officer.” SCOTX 
found the dispute over 
use of the convention 
center for party 
convention to be a 
contractual matter. 
Justice Devine dissented. 
Dismissed 
for want of 
jurisdiction. 





remedy in statute 








waived in part by Open 
Meetings Act remedy to 
block violation by 
injunction or mandamus.
Immunity issued decided 








As stated above, “Mandamus relief is appropriate when a petitioner
demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion and has no adequate remedy by
appeal.”197 In the seminal case of In re Prudential, the Texas Supreme
Court devised a subjective balancing test as to the “adequate remedy by
appeal” element.198 That is, the benefits of granting mandamus regarding
“significant rulings in exceptional cases” are to be weighed against the
detriments of interfering with trial court proceedings and adding to litiga-
tion’s burdens.199
197. In re Geomet Recycling LLC, 578 S.W.3d 82, 91–92 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).
198. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136.
199. Id.
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A. CASES SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING ADEQUACY OF REMEDY BY
APPEAL
The element of the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal was ad-
dressed specifically in three cases during the Survey period. First, in the
In re Abbott case, the Texas Supreme Court considered the “adequacy”
element when it stopped the enforcement of a temporary restraining or-
der.200 Second, in In re C.J.C., a case of first impression, the Texas Su-
preme Court considered the “adequacy” element when it stopped the
appointment of a non-relative as possessory conservator of a minor child,
over the objection of the natural father.201 Third, the Texas Supreme
Court addressed the “adequacy” element in In re Murrin Bros. 1885, Ltd.,
an attorney disqualification case where the court decided the appellate
remedy was adequate.202
Although adequacy of the remedy by appeal was not addressed in In re
Panchakarla,203 other than by a general citation to In re Turner,204 it is
clear that the Texas Supreme Court was effecting a “mid-stream” correc-
tion in the trial process. In effect, without saying so, the supreme court at
least impliedly addressed the inadequacy of the remedy by appeal as re-
quired by In re Prudential.
B. CASES NOT REFERRING TO ADEQUACY OF REMEDY OF APPEAL
The election cases, except for Hotze II,205 and the wrongful conviction
case, In re Lester,206 do not consider the adequacy of the remedy by ap-
peal because they address ministerial duties and the cases were not
brought in trial courts.
The Hotze II case did not commence in a lower court, yet the Texas
Supreme Court considered the requisites of mandamus in the context of
what the supreme court referred to as the relators’ “delay” in pursuing
mandamus at the supreme court.207 Further, instead of citing In re Pru-
dential, the supreme court in Hotze II cited Walker v. Packer, a long-
standing authority issued in 1992, which was clarified and refined by In re
Prudential.208
200. In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 813 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
201. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 811 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding).
202. In re Murrin Bros.1885, Ltd., 603 S.W.3d 53, 55–56, 61–62 (Tex. 2019) (orig.
proceeding).
203. 602 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
204. 591 S.W.3d 121, 124 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).
205. No. 20-0739, 2020 WL 5919726, at *2 (Tex. Oct. 7, 2020) (orig. proceeding).
206. 602 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding).
207. Hotze II, 2020 WL 5919726, at *2 (Tex. 2020); see In re Hotze (Hotze I), No. 20-
0430, 2020 WL 4046034 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding).
208. Hotze II, 2020 WL 5919726, at *3 n.201 (Tex. 2020) (citing Walker v. Packer, 827
S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)).
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C. PRACTICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IN RE
PRUDENTIAL
The Texas Supreme Court’s practice of citing mandamus authorities
other than In re Prudential is not a new phenomenon.209 However, that
practice creates some uncertainty about what authorities should be fol-
lowed by the lower courts and counsel and the viability of the In re Pru-
dential balancing test.210
During the Survey period, only two of the mandamus opinions specifi-
cally cite the seminal case of In re Prudential: In re Turner211 and In re
C.J.C.212 One might assume In re Prudential is cited in those cases be-
cause of its prominence. However, the Texas Supreme Court takes a dif-
ferent approach in the precedential cases of In re Panchakarla213 and In
re Murrin Bros. 1885, Ltd.214 In those cases, the supreme court chose to
cite as authority for mandamus relief, among other cases, In re Turner, a
case that employs In re Prudential as its foundation authority.215 Further,
as noted above in the Hotze II case, the supreme court considered the
requisites of mandamus in the context of what the supreme court referred
to as the relators’ “delay” in pursuing mandamus at the supreme court.216
Once again, In re Prudential was not cited. Rather, the supreme court
selected Walker v. Packer, a long-standing authority issued in 1992, which
authority was clarified and refined by In re Prudential.217 Finally, the un-
certainty is enhanced by the supreme court’s mandamus decisions that
209. For comments about the absence of citations to In re Prudential and the adequacy
of a remedy by appeal in earlier mandamus opinions, see Honorable Douglas S. Lang &
Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions of the Texas Supreme Court, 6
SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 387, 404–07 (2020), https://scholar.smu.edu/smuatxs/vol6/iss1/15
[https://perma.cc/M65H-AQ79] [hereinafter Mandamus 2020]; Honorable Douglas S. Lang
& Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions of the Texas Supreme
Court, 5 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 407, 428 (2019), https://scholar.smu.edu/smuatxs/vol5/iss1/
16 [https://perma.cc/ALV7-5TJX] [hereinafter Mandamus 2019].
210. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig. pro-
ceeding) (“An appellate remedy is ‘adequate’ when any benefits to mandamus review are
outweighed by the detriments. When the benefits outweigh the detriments, appellate
courts must consider whether the appellate remedy is adequate.”).
211. 591 S.W.3d 121, 124 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding) (holding that the limits of dis-
covery of non-party health care provider in a health care liability claim are governed by
Texas Medical Liability Act.).
212. 603 S.W.3d 804, 811 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (noting the family law
presumption).
213. 602 S.W.3d 536, 538–39 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (holding that
the trial court has plenary power to vacate a dismissal order in Texas Citizens Participation
Act case, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.005(a), .008(a)).
214. 603 S.W.3d 53, 57–59 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding) (addressing dual representa-
tion by counsel in derivative litigation).
215. In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d at 539; In re Murrin Bros. 1885, Ltd., 603 S.W.3d at
56.
216. In re Hotze (Hotze II), No. 20-0739, 2020 WL 5919726, at *2 (Tex. Oct. 7, 2020)
(orig. proceeding).
217. Id. at *3 n.20 (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding)).
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are silent regarding whether there is an adequate remedy by appeal.218
In light of those issues, at least two practical questions arise: (1) does
the Texas Supreme Court view In re Prudential as a diminished author-
ity?, and (2) may intermediate appellate courts and practicing lawyers
ignore the element of the adequacy of the remedy by appeal?
The logical answer is “no” to both questions. Until the supreme court
overrules In re Prudential or modifies its holding in some way, lawyers
should be careful to follow strictly that authority.219 Otherwise, variance
from that standard could be fatal to a mandamus petition.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mandamus is an indispensable tool for litigants where “mid-course” er-
ror correction is required and interlocutory appeal is not available. De-
spite the absence of discussion in Texas Supreme Court mandamus
opinions of In re Prudential, its balancing test, and the issue of the ade-
quacy of a remedy by appeal, those elements remain etched in the law.
The burden of proof for the relator bringing a petition has not changed.
218. E.g., In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d at 536–41; In re Green Party of Tex., No. 20-
0708, 2020 WL 5580156, at *1 (Tex. Sept. 18, 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). For
articles that address In re Prudential and the adequacy of a remedy by appeal, see also
Mandamus 2020, supra note 209; Mandamus 2019, supra note 209.
219. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., L.P. v. Mitchell, 276 S.W.3d 443, 447 (Tex. 2008) (discussing stare
decisis and departure from a prior holdings).
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